Are we morally obligated to help

As American military involvement in Vietnam escalated in the mids, Clinton like other male students his age would reasonably have expected that his status as a college student would provide him with deferments from the draft for several more years, especially when in his senior year he was one of thirty-two American men selected to receive Rhodes Scholarships to study at Oxford University in England. However, on 16 February the federal government eliminated draft deferments for most graduate students, and Clinton would therefore no longer be eligible for additional student deferments after he completed his final term at Georgetown in the spring of Accordingly, his draft board reclassified him 1-A available immediately for military service on 20 March In mid Clinton, who maintained that although he was not opposed to the military or war in general he was morally opposed to the Vietnam War in particular, began to seek ways of avoiding the draft.

Are we morally obligated to help

Are we morally obligated to help

A being which merits this kind of moral attention is morally considerable. It has moral standing, and its welfare cannot be ignored. Notice, however, that we may have moral obligations regarding entities which we have no obligations to.

But the chair itself is not morally considerable, and you have no direct obligations to the chair itself. Rather, you have obligations to your neighbor, and therefore you have obligations with respect to the chair. The question of moral standing only concerns the issue of direct obligation.

It asks what things we have obligations to, not for the sake of something else that has moral standing but for the sake of the thing itself. The question of moral considerability is of equal interest to utilitarians and formalists.

For a formalist, a being that is morally considerable is the kind of being that can have rights or the kind of being which can be objects of concern for moral rules.

For example, if a rights-oriented Are we morally obligated to help judged a dog to be morally considerable, this would imply that a dog is the kind of being that can have rights.

It is important to realize that even if we conclude that we have no direct obligations to things like animals and fetuses, that will not mean that we can do anything we want with them.

We often have obligations regarding things that in themselves have no moral standing. We are not lone space explorers. Other people probably care about the fate of fetuses and animals, and we have moral obligations to those people even if we do not have obligations to entities judged to be non-persons.

But the issue of moral considerability is one with great practical implications nonetheless. If fetuses and animals are judged not to be morally considerable, then the only basis for obligation regarding these beings would be that someone with moral standing cares about them.

Or wrong to kill a wanted fetus but all right to do painful experiments on an unwanted fetus, especially if they are done without the knowledge of anti-abortion groups.

Developing Rational Criteria of Moral Considerability If we are committed to a rational approach to ethics, we cannot just decide separately in each instance whether a being has moral standing.

We need consistent principles that help us correct for the distortions brought on by our emotions. Psychologically, we are likely to feel more toward cute, cuddly animals than to intelligent but ugly rats. As space explorers, we probably would favor beings that looked like ourselves, even if there were other, more bizarre-looking creatures around whose mental faculties more closely resembled our own.

But from a strictly rational point of view these are not relevant considerations. There must be something about a particular being that gives it moral standing, and any other being with that same quality must merit the same moral attention. We might consistently employ any of several possible principles to judge that something is morally considerable.

Determining exactly what is needed and what is sufficient for a being to be morally considerable is a daunting task. Some philosophers are content to suggest rough or approximate standards. Others have given up altogether.

A larger issue in the debate on moral considerability is whether we need to be strictly rational in establishing criteria. Some philosophers reject the purely rational approach and claim that the kinds of feelings we have toward a being is a morally relevant consideration. Fetuses The moral standing of the fetus is a topic of heated debate because of its implications both for abortion and for medical experimentation on fetuses.

At the other extreme are those who view even a one-day-old conceptus as a full person. Disagreement exists not only about the moral status of the fetus but on a number of related issues as well. Abortion and fetal experimentation will obviously be easier to justify if the fetus is not morally considerable.

Are we morally obligated to help

But the importance of the issue of moral considerability is itself an area for debate. Some writers on abortion assume that everything depends on whether or not the fetus is a person: But others challenge this view and argue that even if the fetus is a person, there will still be a range of cases where abortion is acceptable and even if the fetus is not a person, abortion may still be wrong in some cases.Are We Morally Obligated to Help Others?

Euthyphro dilemma - Wikipedia

Topics: Utilitarianism, The first reason that we should help homeless people is because The United States is wealthy enough to afford it. In our country we believe in unity, and that we’re only as strong as our weakest citizen.

The United States is one of the top economic powers in the world. Are individuals morally obligated to assist those in need even if it leads to the destruction of all society and extinction of the human race?

You would also comment on the rationality of humans. Are we morally obliged to help others? Are we morally obliged to work? Does one need morals in life? Is it . Yes people are morally obligated to help the less fortunate.

Simple as that. As a society we are supposed to bring one another up and by doing so we must help one another. It would be counterproductive to leave our peers in the rubble while we glamorize our lives. People are in no way obligated to help the less fortunate. We live in a very.

The concept of environmental ethics brings out the fact that all the life forms on Earth have the right to monstermanfilm.com destroying nature, we are denying the life forms this right.

The last opposing opinion might be that people are not morally obligated to help others, but rather that it should be a personal choice. While this position acknowledges charity as positive, it should come from the heart to perform acts of kindness as a personal choice rather than a responsibility or duty/5().

Me and my girlfriend was in a relationship for 2years, we split January this year as she left me home with the 2year old baby witch was her child.

Unwanted Pregnancy: Forced Organ Donation? - Pro-Life Humanists